Abstract: It has been claimed that, for the most part, meaningful IO doctrine is non-existent. This paper explores that claim focusing on US IO doctrine. First, internal issues relating to doctrine architecture are examined. Possible uses of information operations contained in the doctrine are broad, but can be viewed as going some way to incorporate the potential of information operations into the relatively static environment of doctrine. Doctrinal information operations components include a variety of activities that influence the information domain, and these too are generalised enough to accommodate development in IO. However, staff structures and processes on which current US IO doctrine is based are ill-suited to IO. In addition, the doctrine fails to adequately deal with vulnerabilities derived from connectivity between the DII and deployed force networks, and an over-emphasis on the role of IT in IO introduces weaknesses into IO doctrine. Secondly, external issues are addressed. Legal problems associated with the conduct of IO compromise the meaningfulness of IO doctrine, as do problems encountered when conducting IO in multinational environments. Also, the lack of adequate national IO policy adversely affects both the conduct of information operations and the ability to protect military IO vulnerabilities. Overall, although current US IO doctrine contains much that is useful, the points of weakness are fundamental and do indeed significantly degrade the overall meaningfulness of IO doctrine as it stands today.